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Crane and Miralles:

Toward a Unified Theory of Exclusionary
Vertical Restraints

Daniel A. Crane*
Graciela Miralles Murciego**

The law of exclusionary vertical restraints—contractual arrangements
or informal business relationships between vertically related firms that
impair the competitiveness of either the upstream or downstream market—
is largely incoherent in both the United States and the European Union. 1
The sources of this incoherence are potentially two fold.
First, in both jurisdictions antitrust law is primarily made by generalist
courts giving effect to discrete statutory or treaty texts. 2 Hence, some of
the incoherence in the case law may be the product of unavoidable statutory
constructions that require courts to treat economically similar commercial
practices differently despite the economic fungibility of the practices. It is
doubtful, however, that statutory or treaty design accounts for much of the
incoherence. The foundational legal instruments of both jurisdictions are
sufficiently open-textured to accommodate judicial development of a
unified and coherent account of vertical restraints.
Rather than reflecting an avoidable rendering of statutory or treaty
commands, the incoherence largely arises from a failure to grasp the
commonalities among various different forms of vertical restraints. In
particular, much of the confusion arises from the failure to give a
systematic account of the significance of three related factors: (1) whether
the restraint involves a nominal price reduction (as in the case of predatory

* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
** PhD Candidate, Law Department, European University Institute.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference on vertical
restraints at the University of East Anglia, June 2010.
1
In discussing the law of the European Union, we focus on the law developed
under Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(“TFEU”), as interpreted by the European Commission, the European Court of
First Instance, and the European Court of Justice, and not on the national laws of
any Member States of the European Union.
2
See generally DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT, cpts. Xxx, xxx (2010).
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pricing, price discrimination, and bundled discounting) or non-price
coercion (as in the case of exclusive dealing and tying); (2) whether the
restraint involves a single product (as in a single-product exclusive dealing
contract) or multiple products (as in the case of tying arrangements or
bundled discounts); and (3) whether the contract harms competition at the
level of the firm giving the discount (as in the case of “primary line” price
discrimination) or at the level of the firm receiving the discount (as in the
case of “secondary line” price discrimination). 3
In this paper, we argue that all allegedly exclusionary vertical restraints
should be analyzed under a single organizing principle: substantial
foreclosure. In every exclusionary vertical restraints case, the ultimate
question should be whether the loyalty-inducing provision poses an
unacceptable risk of harming consumer welfare by denying to rivals a
reasonable opportunity to participate efficiently in the market and does so
without a sufficient efficiency justification. In order to make this
assessment, three analytical questions must be answered.
First, does the vertical restraint “foreclose” any portion of the relevant
market? The answer depends on whether rivals had a reasonable
opportunity to compete for the contracted business.
A non-price
contractual term that requires one party to deal exclusively with the other
party “forecloses” some percentage of the market to rivals if the rivals were
unable to offer their own exclusive dealing contracts. A contractual
provision that offers a discount to incentivize the customer to do business
only forecloses rivals if the rivals could not profitably offer their own
competitive discounts.
If the restraint involves contractual terms that span multiple products
(as in the case of tying and bundled discounting) it is necessary to identify
one or more markets in which competition is potentially harmed. Once that
market is identified, the question is how much of that market the
contractual arrangement in question places off limits to rivals. If the
contractual arrangement is a price discount, then none of the relevant
markets should be deemed off limits to rivals unless the rivals would have
to price below cost in order to obtain that business. But once some portion
of business in that market is deemed “foreclosed”—either because a party
has contractually committed or because the discounts impacting that
segment of business could not be overcome without pricing below cost—
we have the foreclosure percentage. And then a court or agency should ask
the usual question—is the foreclosure substantial?
In performing a foreclosure analysis, it should not matter whether the
foreclosure occurs at the level of the upstream firm (usually a
manufacturer) or downstream firm (usually a wholesaler or retailer). Thus,
for example, in a primarily line price discrimination case, the question
should be whether the manufacturer priced below cost and, if so, whether
the below-cost pricing was across a sufficient share of the market to

3

See generally Andrew I. Gavil, Secondary Line Price Discrimination and the Fate
of Morton Salt: To Save it, Let it Go, 48 Emory J. J. 1057 (1999).
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substantially foreclose competition. Similarly, in a secondary line case, the
question should be whether the retailer that received the discriminatory
price obtained such a competitive advantage that rivals could not profitably
compete for some segment of retail sales.
Second, once a court or agency determines that some portion of the
market is foreclosed, it must decide whether the foreclosure is substantial.
To date, judicial precedents that have analyzed substantiality have usually
fallen back on generic market share percentages that bear little or no
relationship to the significant economic questions. In economic terms, a
foreclosure percentage should be deemed substantial when it denies rivals a
sufficient probability of obtaining a sufficient amount of business to reach
minimum viable scale. This analysis requires identifying not only the
percentage of the market necessary for a rival to minimize its average costs
(minimum viable scale), but also the probability that the rival will win that
particular increment of business in the unforeclosed segment of the market.
In performing this analysis, a court or agency needs to consider both the
role of an incumbency advantage and the countervailing claim—usually
made by ostensibly frustrated new entrants—that the new entrant’s
technology, product, or service is superior to the status quo.
Third, even if a vertical restraint results in substantial foreclosure, it
should not be declared unlawful if efficiencies resulting from the restraint
and passed onto consumers exceed its anticompetitive effects. 4
This paper’s organization is as follows. In Part I, we provide the
foundational assumptions for a unified theory of exclusionary vertical
restraints. In particular, we explore some differences between exclusionbased theories of vertical restraints—those with which this paper is
concerned—and collusion or exploitation-based theories, which we do not
address here. We also discuss the importance of unifying the approach to
vertical restraints in the US and the EU given the increasingly transAtlantic or global nature of many commercial practices that may be
challenged as exclusionary vertical restraints. In Part II, we survey the
leading US and EU precedents and diagnose the sources of the doctrinal
and analytical incoherence. In Part III, we advance our central normative
claim—that all exclusionary vertical restraints should be analyzed prima
facie within a broad and circumstantially adaptive two-part framework
centering on foreclosure and substantiality. 5 We also assign economic
content to those elements. We do not analyze efficiencies defenses in
vertical restraints cases, but simply observe that such defenses should not
come into play unless the plaintiff meets the prima facie substantial
foreclosure test. Finally, in Part IV, we provide illustrations of our unified

4

Since our paper is not primarily concerned with efficiencies defenses, we do not
address the proper treatment of efficiencies that are captured by producers and not
passed onto consumers. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust
Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 Am. Econ. Rev. (1968).
5
We do not address efficiencies defenses that should arise once the plaintiff makes
a prima facie showing of substantial foreclosure. See infra xxx.
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theory in action in the context of three significant recent vertical restraints
cases.
I. FOUNDATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS
A. Distinguishing Exclusion, Collusion, and Exploitation
Antitrust law may prohibit vertical restraints for three quite different
kinds of reasons. First, vertical restraints have the capacity to exclude
rivals from effectively competing in some market, usually an upstream (or
supply) market or downstream (or resale) market. Second, vertical
restraints may facilitate collusion between firms at either the upstream or
downstream level. 6 For example, colluding retailers may force upstream
suppliers to impose resale price maintenance in vertical contracts in order to
prevent cheating on the retail-level cartel agreement. 7 Finally, a dominant
upstream firm may use vertical contractual practices such as tying,
bundling, or exclusive dealing to engage in price discrimination and hence
to extract consumer surplus from purchasers. 8
This paper concerns only the first of these concerns—exclusionary
vertical restraints. Collusive theories of vertical restraints raise very
different concerns. Collusive vertical restraints are usually manifested as
intra-brand restrictions, such as resale price maintenance or territorial
restrictions. 9 Exclusionary vertical restraints usually operate as inter-brand
restrictions, such as prohibitions on carrying a competing brand or a tying
arrangement that locks out competitive sellers. Collusive restraints often
occur where the colluding firms have little market power individually and
By contrast,
hence must band together to thwart competition. 10
exclusionary vertical restraints are only likely to be practiced by dominant
firm with large market shares. Similarly, collusive restraints involve no
market foreclosure. 11 Indeed, collusion makes entry by new firms easier

6

See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 892-93
(2007); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 172 (2d ed. 2001); Howard P.
Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, The Welfare Effects of Resale Price Maintenance,
28 J. L. & Econ. 363, 373 (1985).
7
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893.
8
Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly
Profit Theory, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 397 (2009).
9
Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893.
10
Market power is not a prerequisite for illegal price fixing. United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). The colluding firms often have no
individual market power at all.
11
It is, of course, possible that a group of dominant firms will collude to exclude
rivals from the market. However, such cases are best analyzed as instances of joint
exclusion where the market power and foreclosure effects of the co-conspirators
are aggregated rather than non-coercive collusion. We consider multi-party
cumulative foreclosure effects below in Part ____.
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since it increases market prices and reduces output. 12 By contrast, as we
argue in Part III, foreclosure is a necessary ingredient of vertical exclusion.
Exploitation is also a very different concern from exclusion.
Exploitation requires market power, but it does not require that the market
power have been obtained through an exclusionary device. For example, a
firm with a valid exclusionary patent might engage in a form of
Exploitation operates only
“exploitative” price discrimination. 13
vertically—it involves the extraction of surplus from a person or firm at a
different level of production or distribution from the exploiting firm. By
contrast, vertical exclusion devices employ vertical relations instrumentally
to exclude competitors, and hence operate horizontally. For example, a
firm that engages in predatory pricing lowers its prices to consumers in
order to exclude a competitor. Later, it increases its prices to recoup the
costs of predation and to earn monopoly profits. 14 This later act of
excessive pricing might be said to be “exploitative,” but it is differently
“exploitative” than emerging theories of exploitation, which rely on the
manipulation of price structures to extract consumer welfare regardless of
any prior exclusion. 15 Prior exclusion is not a necessary ingredient of an
exploitation theory, and exploitation is not a necessary consequence of an
exclusion strategy. Exploitation is not anticompetitive in a conventional
sense, since it does not turn on the avoidance of competition.
There is also an important juridical difference between exclusion and
exploitation. It is doubtful whether US antitrust law recognizes a pure
exploitation theory. 16 By contrast, EU law does—at least in theory. 17
Antitrust laws in many emerging antitrust jurisdictions also recognize
stand-alone exploitation offenses, such as excessive pricing and nonexclusionary price discrimination. 18

12

This is not to say that cartels automatically attract entry. If potential new
entrants understand that current prices are the product of collusion and that new
entry will disrupt the patterns of collusion, then they may not consider entry
worthwhile. See generally Ariel Ezrachi & David Gilo, Are Excessive Prices
Really Self-Correcting?, 5 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 249 (2009).
13
See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on the Exploitation of the Patent
Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 Yale L. J. 267 (1966).
14
Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 2-3
(2005).
15
See, e.g., Elhauge, supra n. xxx.
16
See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Communcs., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct.
1109, 1118 (2009) (holding that simply charging monopoly prices does not violate
Section 2 of the Sherman Act).
17
In theory, Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
prohibits both exclusionary and exploitative abuses of dominance. However,
successful cases challenging abuses of dominance on pure exploitation theories are
rare. John Vickers, Abuse of Market Power, 115 Econ. J. F244, F246 (2005) (“All
but a few EC cases on abuse of dominance have concerned exclusionary conduct
by dominant firms--that is, conduct preventing or restricting competitors--rather
than behavior directly exploitative of consumers.”).
18
ELEANOR FOX & DANIEL CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES IN ANTITRUST AND
COMPETITION LAW (West 2010).
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Although the conceptual foundations of these three separate theories of
vertical restraint are quite different, antitrust law often fails to distinguish
clearly which theory of wrong it is addressing with a particular analytic
matrix. For example, tying arrangements may be anticompetitive because
they exclude competitors, 19 facilitate cartel arrangements, 20 or extract
surplus from consumers. 21 However, antitrust law often approaches tying
as a unified legal wrong amenable to a single test. For instance, under U.S.
case law the seller’s share of the tying market must generally be thirty to
forty percent in order for the tying to be illegal. 22 But a single market share
screen makes little sense in light of the different possible theories of wrong.
If the tie-in is wrongful because it excludes competitors in the tied market,
then a fairly high degree of market power in the tying market is likely
necessary. If it is wrongful because it represents a cartel-stabilization
effort, then a much lower market share might be sufficient.
Although this paper does not propose an analytic framework for
collusive or exploitative theories of harm, one implication of the framework
we propose for exclusionary theories is that the plaintiff in a vertical
restraints case should be required to articulate with precision which theory
it is advancing. The relevant analytical questions in exclusion, exploitation,
and collusion cases are quite different. Adopting a unified theory of
exclusionary vertical restraints is reasonable; adopting a unified theory of
vertical restraints is nonsensical.
B. The Need and Opportunity for a Unified Trans-Atlantic Approach
Divergences in US and EU treatment of exclusionary vertical restraints
are unexceptional, since US and EU competition laws differ in many
important respects. 23 Nonetheless, there are at least three compelling
reasons for articulating a theory capable of unifying and rationalizing the
law of exclusionary vertical restraints in both jurisdictions.
First, as we shall note in the following section, the existing bodies of
US and EU law on exclusionary vertical restraints are incoherent internally
and not just conflicting with each other. Each of the bodies of law is in
need of systematization within a coherent economic framework, and there
19

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481-85 (1992)
(examining elements of a tying claim brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
which concerns monopolization).
20
See Christopher R. Leslie, Tying Conspiracies, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2247
(2007).
21
Elhauge, surpa n. xxx at xxx.
22
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26 n.43 (1984); TimesPicayune Pub. Co. v. U.S., 345 U.S. 594, 611-13 (1953).
23
See generally, Heike Schweitzer, Parallels and Differences in the Attitudes
toward Single-Firm Conduct: What Are the Reasons? The History, Interpretation,
and Underlying Principles of Sec. 2 of the Sherman Act and Art. 82 EC, (2007)
LAW 2007/32 EUI Working Papers; Eleanor M. Fox, GE/Honeywell: The Merger
that Europe Stopped—A Story of the Politics of Convergence in ANTITRUST
STORIES (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane, eds. 2007).
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is no good reason to systematize the two bodies differently. While the
foundational legal instruments of the two systems (the US statutes and EU
treaty provisions) imply different approaches on certain vertical issues—
such as exploitative uses of market power or intra-brand restraints that
segment the common European market at national borders 24 —the
foundational instruments require no difference of approach on exclusionary
vertical restraints.
To the extent that the two jurisdictions differ on matters of emphasis—
for example, the relative priority to be given to short run or long run effects
or default assumptions in the absence of clear proof—such differences can
be expressed within the unified framework we propose. For example, some
commentators believe that EU law tends to give priority to short-run
consumer pricing effects over long-run interests in innovation. 25 The
relative priority of those two competing interests can be expressed during
the balancing of anticompetitive effects against offsetting efficiencies.
However, differences in the relative weights accorded to each interest in the
different jurisdictions do not negate the substantial foreclosure framework
for ascertaining whether a vertical restraint even excludes any rival.
Second, an increasing number of exclusionary vertical restraints cases
involve commercial practices by dominant suppliers that span the American
and Europeans markets. Recent parallel cases in the US and EU against
Intel 26 and Microsoft, 27 for example, have exposed significant analytic
differences between the US and EU approaches with respect to the same
commercial practices involving the same competitors and customers. For
example, the European Commission insisted that Microsoft “unbundle” its
PC operating system, Windows, and its media player. 28 The EU decision
effectively required Microsoft to redesign its operating system for the
European market, since Microsoft was permitted to continue to carry the
“bundled” version of Windows in the rest of the world. In 2005, Microsoft
24

See Nicola Giocoli, Competition Versus Property Rights: American Antitrust
Law, The Freiburg School, and the Early Years of European Competition Policy, 5
J. Comp. L. & Econ. 747 (2009) (explaining European hostility to intra-brand
vertical restraints as grounded in common market objectives); Illene Knable Gotts,
Nature vs. Nurture and Reaching the Age of Reason: The US/EU Treatment of
Transatlantic Mergers, 61 NYU Sur. Am. L. 453, 471-72 (2005).
25
See, e.g., Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Microsoft’s Five Fatal Flaws, 2009
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 67, 71; J. Bruce McDonald, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen.
in Antitrust Div., Dep’t. of Justice, Section 2 and Article 82: Cowboys and
Gentlemen, Presentation to the Modernisation of Article 82 Conference (June 16,
2005) available at http:// www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/210873.htm.
26
See infra text accompanying notes xxx-xxx.
27
An examination of the various cases against Microsoft appears in WILLIAM H.
PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH
TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE (2007).
28
Commission of the European Communities, Commission Decision of 24.03.2004
relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C3/37.782 Microsoft), art 6(a), 2004 OJ (C900), available online at
<http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf>
(visited Jan 11, 2009).
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complied with the EU’s decision and began to make available “Windows
XP Home Edition N,” with the “N” conspicuously and clumsily—as if to
make the point—standing for “not with Media Player.” Although the
European Court of First Instance eventually affirmed the Commission’s
decision, 29 “Edition N” proved highly unpopular with original equipment
manufacturers serving the European market and very few installed it on
their computers. Microsoft thus redesigned its operating system for the
European market only to find no takers. A unified approach to
exclusionary vertical restraints in the US and EU might not have avoided
this debacle, since a common analytical framework does not guarantee
identical application in both jurisdictions. It would, however, reduce the
likelihood of similar occurrences in the future.
Third, the time is ripe for a comprehensive examination of vertical
restraints policy. In the US, the law governing a wide variety of
exclusionary vertical practices—including bundled discounting, exclusive
dealing, tying, and secondary line price discrimination—is currently in play
in the courts and the academy. Richard Posner has opined that “[a]ntitrust
policy toward vertical restraints is the biggest substantive issue facing
antitrust.”30 In Europe, the European Commission recently announced its
intention to move from a formalistic or “form-based” approach to abuse of
dominance issues to an “effects” based approach. 31 This shift in approach
may facilitate moving vertical restraints policy into a unified economic
framework. While both jurisdictions struggle in parallel with the same
issues and increasingly rely on economic analysis—which has no juridical
borders—the possibility of convergence is enhanced.

II. US AND EU PRECEDENTS
A. U.S. Precedents
In the US, courts typically analyze exclusionary vertical restraints
under one of five statutory provisions: Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
which prohibits contract, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of
trade; Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolizing; Section
3 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits anticompetitive tying and exclusive
dealing; the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits anticompetitive price
discrimination; and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which
empowers the FTC to prohibit unfair methods of competition. Rather than
following statutory lines, the courts have largely divided exclusionary
29

Microsoft Corp v Commission, Case T-201/04, [2007] 5 CMLR 11, ¶¶ 1345–66
(Sept 17, 2007) (European Court of First Instance).
30
See Richard A. Posner, Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 72 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 229, 229 (2005) (“Antitrust policy toward vertical restraints is the biggest
substantive issue facing antitrust.”).
31
Neelie Kroes, Preliminary Thoughts on Policy Review of Article 82, prepared
remarks at Fordham Corporate Law Institute (2005).
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vertical restraints into classes of commercial conduct that overlap statutory
categories. Thus, for example, courts consider primary line price
discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act to be functionally
equivalent to predatory pricing under the Sherman Act, but consider
secondary line price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act to be a
separate offense from primary line price discrimination. 32 Tying offenses
are cognizable under Section 3 of the Clayton Act or Sections 1 or 2 of the
Sherman Act, without much distinction between the statutory source. 33
Although the courts have largely treated the causes of action associated
with potentially anticompetitive vertical restraints to apply regardless of the
statutory provision invoked by the plaintiff, they have often abandoned this
functional approach when addressing different forms of exclusionary
vertical restraints.
Instead, they have created sometimes formalist
sometimes functionalist doctrines depending on the type of restraint at
issue. In many cases, the courts have treated similar forms of vertical
restraints quite differently based on insubstantial classificatory distinctions.
In particular, the courts have treated as unjustifiably significant the
distinctions between single-product and multi-product practices, primary
and secondary line effects, and price or non-price terms of sale or exchange.
Significant doctrinal differences between the treatment of tying (which
necessarily involves two products) and exclusive dealing (which need only
involve one product) exemplify the overemphasis on the differences
between single and multi-product practices. Often, the same conduct could
be described as either tying or exclusive dealing. 34 For example, in the
Standard Stations case, 35 the Justice Department challenged Standard Oil’s
requirement that independent gasoline retailers sell Standard’s oil
exclusively as an exclusive dealing requirement. As Herbert Hovenkamp
has noted, however, the arrangement “could also have been described as a
tying arrangement in which the franchise itself, or the right to bear the
32

See XIV HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 2300, at 3 (1999). Primary and secondary
line price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act overlap on many
statutory elements—such as the “roughly contemporaneous,” “sales,”
“commodities,” and “like grade and quality” requirements, id., but those statutory
elements have little to do with the economic substance of the antitrust analysis.
33
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 23 n. 39 (1984)
(observing that “with respect to the definition of tying the standards used by the
two statutes [the Clayton Act and Section 1 of the Sherman Act] are the same”);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481-85 (1992)
(acknowledging that “[m]onopoly power under § 2 requires, of course, something
greater than market power under § 1,” but otherwise reaching same conclusions
about tying conduct under both Sections 1 and 2 of Sherman Act”).
34
XI HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1800b, at 7-12 (2005) (distinguishing
causes of action for tying and exclusive dealing and observing that “[m]any of the
practices that have been characterized as exclusive dealing could also be described
as tying, although perhaps not all of the technical legal requirements for a tying
arrangement could be met”).
35
Standard Oil of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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Standard brand, or the right to use tanks and pumps that Standard provided
its dealers was conditioned on their purchase of gasoline from Standard.” 36
Similarly, in Jefferson Parish, 37 five Justices saw a hospital’s agreement to
use a single anesthesiology service as a tying arrangement (albeit a legal
one) whereas four concurring Justices imagined it as a species of exclusive
dealing arrangement. 38
Whether an arrangement is characterized as tying or exclusive dealing
has important implications under U.S. law, since the courts have
traditionally treated tying arrangements with considerably greater
hostility—more formally and categorically—than they have treated
exclusive dealing arrangements. 39 However, to the extent that the concern
in tying cases is over the exclusion of rivals in the tied market and not
exploitation of consumers through price discrimination, 40 the exclusionary
effects of tying and exclusive dealing depends equally on the foreclosure of
rivals. Indeed, if anything, tying arrangements may generally be less
threatening to rivals in the tied market than exclusive dealing arrangements,
since tying arrangements often apply to only particular uses of the product
in the tied market (for example, in conjunction with a particular machine)
whereas exclusive dealing contracts blanketly forbid the buyer from
purchasing any of its requirements from the seller’s rivals. 41 This is not to
say that tying arrangements should be treated with greater leniency than
exclusive dealing arrangements—only that in either case, the first step is to
evaluate how much of the relevant market is foreclosed to competitors.
Some courts have drawn a similar dividing line between single-product
predatory pricing and multi-product bundled discounting. 42 In 3M v.
LePage’s, 43 for example, an en banc panel of the United States Court of
Appeal for the Third Circuit held that bundled discounting should not be
governed by single-product predatory pricing rules but instead should be
analogized to tying arrangements whose “foreclosure effects are similar.” 44
That characterization was problematic. While recognizing the analytical
similarity between price and non-price practices (bundled discounting and
tying), it assumed that a bundled discount forecloses rivals in a significantly
different manner than single-product predation. As we shall show in the
36

XI Hovenkamp, supra n. xxx at 7.
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
38
XI Hovenkamp, supra n. xxx at 7.
39
Id. at 10-11.
40
See Elhauge, supra n. xxx at xxx.
41
XI Hovenkamp, supra n. xxx at 10-11.
42
A bundled discount involves the seller’s offer to sell two or more products at a
discounted package price, even though the seller is still willing to make the two
products available for individual purchase. See Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling,
Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 Emory L. J. 423, 425 (2006).
43
LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
44
Id. at 155 (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶ 794, at 83 (Supp. 2002) (asserting that “[r]ather than analogizing [bundled
discounts] to predatory pricing, , [bundled discounts] are best compared with tying,
whose foreclosure effects are similar.”).
37
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following section, in both single-product and multi-product discounting
contexts, the competitor is only foreclosed if it cannot reasonably match its
rivals’ prices. While the precise questions necessary to ascertain whether or
not this is true may vary depending whether single or multi-product
discounting is at issue, the fundamental foreclosure issue is the same.
A second manifestation of doctrinal and analytical incoherence
concerns the radically different treatment accorded to primary line and
secondary line price discrimination. As previously noted, 45 under U.S. law
primary line price discrimination (which concerns injury to competition at
the level of the firm giving the discount—usually a manufacturer) is
addressed under the same standards as predatory pricing under the Sherman
Act. To satisfy its prima facie case, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant priced below the “appropriate measure of cost” and that its
conduct created a dangerous probability that the defendant would later be
able to recoup its costs of predation through supracompetitive pricing. 46
Under U.S. case law, however, secondary line price discrimination (which
concerns injury to competition at the level of the firm receiving the
discount—usually a dealer) is an odd and aberrational antitrust offense.
There is no requirement that the firm giving the discount has market
power, 47 nor any requirement of a general injury to the competitive
process—an injury to a single competitor may be sufficient. 48 There is not
even a requirement that the discriminatory price have threatened the
disadvantaged firm’s existence in the market. 49
In its most recent secondary line case, the Supreme Court signaled a
potential willingness to change course and harmonize secondary line price
discrimination with the broader currents of antitrust law that are focused on
the protection of the competitive process rather than individual
competitors. 50 If so, the Court will need to significantly revise secondary
line price discrimination doctrine to introduce analytical tools of the kind
that are employed in primary line cases. In particular, it will need to
articulate the questions that judges and juries should ask in determining
whether a discriminatory discount to one dealer impaired that dealers’
rivals’ ability to compete efficiently in the market. As set forth in the
following section, that inquiry should depend upon the same kind of
showing currently required in predatory pricing and primary line cases, that
45

Supra text accompanying nn. xxx-xxx.
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222,
224 (2003).
47
See, e.g., Texaco v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 547 (1990). See also Hovenkamp,
supra n. xxx ¶ 2301b, at 7.
48
See Chroma Lighting v. GTE Prods. Corp., 111 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1998); Rebel
Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1445 (9th Cir. 1995).
49
See Hovenkamp, supra n. xxx at ¶ 2331 at 80-90. See also FTC v. Morton Salt,
324 U.S. 726 (1945).
50
Volvo Trucks of North America, Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164,
181 (2006) (“[W]e would resist interpretation [of the Robinson-Patman Act] geared
more to the protection of existing competitors than to the stimulation of
competition.) (emphasis in original).
46
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the rival dealer would have had to sell its goods below cost in order to
compete, and hence was foreclosed from some segment of the relevant
market.
This latter observation raises a third branch of inconsistency in U.S.
treatment of exclusionary vertical restraints. As already noted, the plaintiff
in a predatory pricing case must show that the defendant priced below cost.
Any below-cost sales are considered off-limits to an equally efficient rival,
and hence anticompetitive. At that point, the analysis in exclusive dealing
and predatory pricing cases seems to converge on the foreclosure effect of
the vertical restraint. In exclusive dealing cases, however, foreclosure is
only one ingredient. In order for the foreclosure to be illegal, it must be
“substantial.” 51 Trivial amounts of foreclosure through exclusive dealing
do not exclude rivals. The same is true of predatory pricing. Trivial
amounts of predatory pricing—say below-cost pricing on just one or two
contracts in market with hundreds of customers—cannot exclude rivals.
Predation can only exclude rivals if it forecloses them from so much of the
market that they cannot efficiently remain in the market. However, under
U.S. case law, “substantiality” is not an identified element of a predatory
pricing claim. Some courts have rejected predatory pricing claims where
the plaintiff offered only selective evidence of predation or failed to show
pricing across the defendant’s entire product line, 52 but the courts have not
articulated a systematic principle of substantiality in predatory pricing cases
and, at times, have allowed plaintiffs to proceed on evidence of selective
predation without a showing of overall market foreclosure. 53 Although the
foreclosure effects of price and non-price vertical restraints are often
analytically identical, extant doctrine treats price and non-price as though
they were completely distinct species of offense.
In sum, the U.S. case law contains no general theory of exclusionary
vertical restraints. It tends to muddle through on a practice-by-practice
basis, sometimes drawing weak analogies to, other times weak distinctions
from, other forms of vertical restraints. These distinctions are not justified
by any general theory of exclusionary conduct or any statutory imperative.
Rather, they are the products of uneven evolution of economic
understanding and path dependence based on the happenstance of how
cases were presented to and decided by courts, often generations ago.

B. E.U. Precedents
51

Tampe Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 329 (1961).
E.g., Vollrath Co. v. Sammi Corp., 9 F.3d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993); Morgan v.
Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 1361-62 (8th Cir. 1989); Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion
Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1988); Directory Sales Management
Corp. v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 833 F.2d 606, 614 (6th Cir. 1987); Lomar Wholesale
Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter’s Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 597-98 (8th Cir.
1987); Bayou Bottling, Inc. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 725 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1984);
Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 1977).
53
See, e.g., C.E. Servs., Inc. v. Control Data Group, 759 F.2d 1241, 1247 (5th Cir.
1985).
52
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Vertical restraints analysis under EU competition law exhibits similar
incoherence. As with the US, it is possible to identify three sources of
incoherence. The first concerns the different legal treatment of the same
practice depending on which section of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (“TFEU”) is applied. The second relates to the different
treatment of practices having similar economic effects based on superficial
differences in the challenged conduct. The third involves the still unclear
interpretation of the concept of anticompetitive foreclosure. Clarifying
these ambiguities is necessary for establishing a consistent framework of
analysis, providing predictable standards for firms, and promoting
consumer welfare.
An initial source of analytical incoherence has textual roots, although it
is doubtful that the textual differences require the degree of analytical
difference reflected in judicial decisions. The texts of the articles in the
TFEU dealing with competition policy imply a different approach to the
treatment of concerted or joint practices 54 on the one hand, and unilateral
conduct on the other. This is reflected in two textual provisions that apply
exclusively to concerted practices. First, under the Article 101.1, the
provision relating to concerted practices, only agreements that “may affect
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common
market” are considered anticompetitive. An assessment of foreclosure is
intrinsically required. Second, even if a concerted practice triggers scrutiny
under Article 101.1, Article 101.3 55 permits justifying any such practice on
efficiency grounds. 56
Article 102, dealing with unilateral conduct, refers to the illegality of an
abuse of dominant position in the relevant market. 57 The treaty’s text
allows no ex post justification of a practice deemed abusive, nor does it

54

By concerted practice we refer to the meeting of wills in the form of an
agreement or other as opposed to the unilateral conduct deployed by a single
undertaking.
55
Article 101.3 of the TFEU: “The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be
declared inapplicable in the case of: any agreement or category of agreements
between undertakings, any decision or category of decisions by associations of
undertakings, any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, which
contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the
resulting benefit, and which does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned
restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; (b)
afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a
substantial part of the products in question”. This provision is further developed by
the 'Commission Communication – Notice – Guidelines on the application of
Article 81(3) of the Treaty', in,OJ 101, 27.4.2004, p. 97 2004).
56
Case T-17/93. Matra Hachette SA v Commission of the European Communities.
[1994] ECR II-00595 at para 85 (“[N]o anti-competitive practice can exist which,
whatever the extent of its effects on a given market, cannot be exempted, provided
that all the conditions laid down in Article 85(3) of the Treaty are satisfied and the
practice in question has been properly notified to the Commission”).
57
Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461 at para 91.
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require an analysis of anticompetitive effects. Justifications are permitted,
if at all, in the threshold assessment of whether a practice is abusive at all. 58
From this difference in the Treaty texts, courts have extrapolated
significant consequences. The same or very similar practices could often be
analyzed either as an abuse of dominance or as a concerted practice, with
dramatically different results. 59
European jurisprudence under Article 101 has followed a similar
analytical distinction to the dichotomous categorization under US law of
some restraints as hard core violations that are per se illegal and all other
restraints that are adjudged under an effects-based rule of reason. 60
Reflecting Article 101’s prohibition on restraints that restrict competition
by either “object or effect,” the European courts have developed separate
analytical approaches for “restraints by object” and “restraints by effect.”
Since its earliest cases, the European Court of Justice, now Court of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU), analyzed vertical restraints as possible
restrictions of competition by effect rather than by object, unless a clear
anticompetitive intent was present. 61 Practically, this meant that most
vertical restraints were analyzed for their foreclosure effects when
scrutinized under Article 101.
Not so under Article 102. Unlike in Article 101 cases, the European
authorities did not feel compelled to look at the effects of a given practice
once it had been tagged as an anticompetitive practice performed by a
dominant firm. 62 The General Court (GC), formerly known as Court of
First Instance, encapsulated this form-based approach in Michelin II: “[F]or
the purposes of applying Article [102 TFEU], establishing the anticompetitive object and the anti-competitive effect are one and the same
58

AG JACOBS, 'conclusions in Case C-53/03, 28 October 2004- Syfait vs.
GlaxoSmithKline', in 2004) at ¶ 72.
59
Frank H. Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for
Exclusionary Conduct', 2003 Colum. Bus. L. Rev, 345, 345 (“Aggressive,
competitive conduct by any firm, even one with market power, is beneficial to
consumers. Courts should prize and encourage it. Aggressive, exclusionary conduct
is deleterious to consumers, and courts should condemn it. The big problem lies in
this: competitive and exclusionary conduct look alike”).
60
This terminology, however, is not totally accurate. See RICHARD WHISH,
COMPETITION LAW 130-31 (Oxford University Press 2009) (discussing the danger
of importing those terms from US law).
61
Case 56/65 Societé Technique Minière [1966] ECR 235 at 248 ("[I}n order to
decide whether an agreement containing a clause 'granting an exclusive right of
sale' is to be considered as prohibited by reason of its object or its effect, it is
appropriate to take into account in particular the nature and quantity, limited or
otherwise, of the products covered by the agreement, the position and importance
of the grantor and the concessionaire on the market for the products concerned, the
isolated nature of the disputed agreement or, alternatively, its position in a series of
agreements, the severity of the clauses intended to protect the exclusive dealership
or, alternatively, the opportunities allowed for other commercial competitors in the
same products by way of parallel re-exportation and importation.").
62
See Whish, supra n. xxx att 194 on the lack of a clear definition about what
constitutes an abuse: “A quite different approach to defining abuse would be to
suggest that it consists of all those practices that the Community Courts have found
to be abusive in the cases that have come before them”.
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thing...If it is shown that the object pursued by the conduct of an
undertaking in a dominant position is to limit competition, that conduct will
also be liable to have such an effect.” 63 This interpretation is particularly
dangerous in the absence of a possible exemption mirroring the one
contained in Article 101.3, since even restrictions of competition by object
can theoretically be exempted under that escape valve. If there are no
genuine per se rules under Article 101, it is hard to see the justification for
such rules under Article 102. 64
The Delimitis decision of the CJEU articulates a broad foreclosure test
for exclusionary vertical restraints under Article 101. 65 The European
Commission challenged an exclusive dealing contract between a brewery
and a reseller exploiting an outlet owned by that brewery. The retailer
agreed to carry only the brewer’s products (beer and soft drinks). This form
of agreement was common in the industry and was only one of many
similar contracts whose cumulative effects on competition in the EU market
the Court considered. The Court established that, given that competitors’
access to the market of beer consumption was the key issue at stake, the
effects of this bundle of agreements depended mainly on the number of tied
outlets in a national territory, the duration of the commitments, and the
quantities involved in comparison with those sold by non-tied outlets. 66 The
Court articulated a two-part test for such agreements: (1) access, whether
the agreement foreclosed market participation by rivals, and (2)
significance of the agreement at issue. 67 There was a clear conception that
without market power the efficiencies associated with a vertical restraint
would outweigh any anticompetitive effect, and that even in a context
where similar agreements might have compromised other players’ ability to
compete in the relevant market, the agreement at issue was to be prohibited
only if it itself significantly contributed to this foreclosure.
Delimitis provided a clear path for subsequent regulatory activity of the
European Commission in similar Article 101 cases. When issuing block
exemptions for various categories of restraints of trade unlikely to harm
competition, the Commission has hewed to a foreclosure-based approach.
Under the De minimis Notice, 68 agreements by small and medium-sized
undertakings below a given market-share threshold are deemed to lack an
appreciable impact on intra-community trade or competition and therefore
do not fall under Article 101.1 of the TFEU provided that they do not touch
upon certain core restrictions of competition by object. 69 The Vertical

63

Case T-203/01 Michelin v Commission (Michelin II) [2003] ECR II-4071 at ¶
241.
64
Denis Waelbroeck, Michelin II: A Per Se Rule Against Rebates by Dominant
Companies?, 1 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 153 (2005)
65
Case C-234/89 Stergios Delimitis v Henninger Bräu AG. [1991] ECR I-00935
66
Id. at para 19
67
Id. at para 76
68
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 'Commission Notice on agreements of minor
importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 81(1) of the
Treaty establishing the European Community (de minimis)', in,Official Journal C
368 , 22/12/2001 P. 0013 - 0015 2001).
69
Id. at in.para 11
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Block Exemption Regulation (vBER) 70 refers to categories of vertical
agreements that, falling within the scope of Article 101.1, qualify for an
exemption under Article 101.3 of the TFEU as they are presumed to satisfy
its conditions with a sufficient degree of certainty. The key element of the
presumption that the added efficiencies will outweigh any possible
anticompetitive effects is again the lack of foreclosing effects. When
neither the supplier nor the buyer have more than 30% market share and the
agreement does not include any non-indispensable obligations or hard-core
restrictions, 71 the block exemption applies.
Although the effects-based approach under Article 101 works relatively
well when the Commission considers Article 101 to apply, trouble shows
up with the initial question of which treaty provision to apply. The recently
reformed Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (GVR) 72 propose a four-step,
effects-based assessment to determine whether an undertaking falls within
the vBER 73 . However, the Guidelines specify that, in principle, dominant
undertakings cannot qualify for an exemption.
The Guidelines’ implicit assumption is that vertical restraints by
dominant firms shift into Article 102 territory, which entails a significant
analytical disconnect from Article 101 analysis. The classic definition of
abuse of dominance under Article 102, established by the CJEU in
Hoffmann-LaRoche, does not turn upon efficiency or market foreclosure but
rather upon a formalistic view of what constitutes competition on the
merits. 74 This implies a rather awkward task considering that an
anticompetitive practice under Article 102 might be totally legitimate in the
absence of a finding of dominance. The European Community Courts have
70

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 'Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20
April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty of the Functioning of
the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices',
in,OJ L 102, 23/04/2010 P. 0001–0007 2010).
71
The detailed list of incompatible provisions is contained in Articles 4 and 5 of
the vBER.
72
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 'Commission notice - Guidelines on Vertical
Restraints', in,Official Journal C 130, 19/05/2010 P. 0001 - 0046 2010).
73
The proposed methodology involves a four-step assessment including (1) an
initial definition of the relevant market in order to assess (2) if the agreement falls
within the scope of application of the vBER. If the relevant market share is above
30% or, for any other reason, the presumption of compliance established in the
vBER does not apply to the agreement at issue, the next step (3) will establish if the
agreement restricts competition in the sense of Article 101.1 of the TFEU. Should
the agreement fall within the scope of application of Article 101.1, it will be
determined (4) whether this restriction might be outweighed by its associated
efficiencies in the sense of Article 101.3.
74
Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission at ¶ 91 (“[T]he concept of abuse
is an objective concept relating to the behavior of an undertaking in a dominant
position which is such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a result of
the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is
weakened and which, through recourse to methods different from those which
condition normal competition in products or services on the basis of the
transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance
of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that
competition”).
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undertaken the task of defining certain categories and subcategories of
practices considered abusive if performed by a dominant undertaking.
An example of this categorization is provided by the non-cost related
analysis of a price-based practice such as rebates, also analyzed within
Article 101 under the heading of single-branding obligations as a quantityforcing device. In one of its early cases on abuse of dominance, Suiker
Unie, the CJEU established a general distinction leading to the dualist
understanding of quantity rebates as cost-justified and thus procompetitive
versus loyalty-enhancing rebates as anticompetitive: “[T]he fidelity rebate,
unlike quantity rebates exclusively linked with the volume of purchases
from the producer concerned, is designed through the grant of a financial
advantage to prevent customers from obtaining their supplies from
competing producers.” 75 This formalistic categorization has prevailed from
initial cases characterized by the superdominant position of the incumbents
–upon which the inference of market foreclosure was built–up until recent
cases involving more controversial findings of dominance. 76 In 2003, the
General Court categorically stated that “it may be inferred generally from
the case-law that any loyalty-inducing rebate system applied by an
undertaking in a dominant position has foreclosure effects prohibited by
Article [102 of the TFEU].” 77
This position presents a problem of over-all coherence as it leads to two
different standards for the assessment of rebates depending on the Article
under which they will be tackled. Thus, while the effects-based assessment
performed under Article 101 takes into account the efficiencies associated
to rebate systems in the framework of single branding vertical restraints–
hold-up, adverse selection, and moral hazard problems 78 –the inference of
foreclosure in Michelin II was based upon the assumption that, other than a
strict cost-related justification, no efficiencies can come from such a system
when enabled by a dominant undertaking. Proving cost justification is
extremely difficult, 79 which means that dominant firms face a nearly
irrebutable presumption that certain practices foreclose and lack any
efficiency justification.
The second source of analytical confusion arises from the interaction
between the categorization inherent to the form-based approach under

75

Case Joined cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114-73 Coöperatieve
Vereniging "Suiker Unie" UA and others v Commission of the European
Communities [1975] ECR-1663 ¶ 518.
76
Chronological table of the market shares of the incumbents in cases of rebates
defended
before
the
European
Community
Courts:

77

Case T-203/01 Michelin v Commission (Michelin II) at para 65
The GVR establish that single branding obligations of up to 80% of a customer’s
requirements will be lawful if no longer than five years.
79
This defense has never held yet as the European Community Courts have
consistently considered the cost-related justification put forward by the firms as too
vague. See Case T-203/01 Michelin v Commission (Michelin II) at para 108; Case
T-219/99 British Airways v. Commission [2003] ECR II-5917at para 285.
78
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Article 102 and the effects-based analysis under Article 101. When a joint
assessment of the same practice is performed under both norms, the
divergences become apparent, thus ultimately leading to the application of
different standards within Article 102 itself to practices having very similar
economic effects. The General Court provided an example of this internal
lack of coherence through two decisions delivered within less than one
month but adopting a dissimilar methodology for the assessment of single
branding obligations, one in the form of price-based conduct (rebates) and
another in the form of non-price-based conduct (exclusive dealing).
In the Michelin II case previously discussed, the court found that
loyalty-inducing rebates categorically have foreclosure effects when
undertaken by dominant firms. In Van den Bergh Foods 80 , however, the
court faced a firm with an even greater market share than in Michelin II and
yet applied a foreclosure-based effects analysis. The apparent difference
was that the Van den Bergh restraint did not directly involve price. The
largest producer of ice cream in Ireland (HB) held a 75% market share of
the impulse ice cream market and distributed its product through 40% of ice
cream retailers. The producer made available freezer cabinets free of cost
but specified that rivals’ ice cream could not be stored in its freezers. The
General Court found that this constituted a common practice in the
industry 81 that did not foreclose competitors in an absolute way, as retailers
could in theory sell other brands of ice cream, but acted as an entry barrier
that made rivals’ access to the market difficult 82 because of the limited
space available in the outlets and the ‘unavoidable trade partner’ status of
HB. The Commission had condemned the practice both under Article 101
and 102 as, on the one hand, the exclusivity clause contained in the
agreements could not be exempted on the grounds of Article 101.3, and, on
the other, it also constituted an abuse of its dominant position in as far as it
induced retailers not to have other freezers in their outlets by offering them
HB’s for free. The Court upheld the Commission Decision but, to do so, it
carried out a detailed analysis of the market structure as well as of the
possible efficiencies of HB’s strategy in order to establish the foreclosure
effects associated with it. Even if the Court accepted that an untied demand
of 60% of retailers did not allow it to automatically assume the existence of
anticompetitive foreclosure in the market, the analysis of the economic and
legal context of the agreement in the sense of Delimitis as well as the
presence of cumulative effects of similar contracts to which HB’s
agreements contributed significantly, were considered likely to foreclose
actual or potential competitors from the market of impulse ice cream.

80

Case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods v Commission [2003] ECR II-4653 para 86
and 104
81
Id. at ¶ 18. Only 17% of Irish retailers had non-exclusive freezers opposed to
83% of outlets where a supplier had provided freezers with an exclusivity clause.
HB had provided 67% of these freezers. The 40% tied demand accounted for those
retailers that only had HB freezers meaning that the extra 27% referred to retailers
with more than one exclusive freezer.
82
Id. at ¶ 63.
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The inconsistencies relating to the treatment of unilateral conduct made
clear that there was a need for reassessing the application of Article 102. 83
In 2005, former European Commissioner Neelie Kroes announced the
intention to evolve from the traditional form-based approach to dominance
towards a case-by-case analysis of the actual or likely effects of dominant
firm conduct. The main tool for its implementation was to be the
construction of a specific theory of foreclosure in order to evaluate whether
a given practice had indeed a distorting effect in the market, rather than
simply foreclosing one or two less efficient competitors. 84 Subsequently,
DG Competition published a discussion paper 85 calling for a
reinterpretation of the definition provided by the ECJ in Hoffmann that had
served to substantiate the previous form-based approach.
The Guidance Paper 86 announced that the Commission’s Article 102
enforcement priorities would be the assessment of “Anticompetitive
Foreclosure” as its central element. This concept is defined as “a situation
where effective access of actual or potential competitors to supplies or
markets is hampered or eliminated as a result of the conduct of the
dominant undertaking whereby the dominant undertaking is likely to be in a
position to profitably increase price to the detriment of consumers.” 87 The
factors taken into account by the Commission to assess the existence of
Anticompetitive Foreclosure will be (1) the strength of the incumbent’s
position; (2) the conditions of the relevant market, particularly the
conditions of entry and expansion; (3) the position of the competitors,
customers and input suppliers; (4) the extent of the allegedly abusive
conduct; and (5) possible evidence both of foreclosure as well as direct
evidence of any exclusionary strategy developed by the incumbent. 88
Furthermore, these factors will be supplemented by more detailed criteria
governing different species of exclusionary conducts.
Overall, the paper makes a good deal of progress by granting similar
treatment to price and non-price based conduct, thus recognizing their
similar economic effects. Although it continues to deals with single and
multi-product rebates under the respective headings of exclusive dealing
and tying and margin squeeze as a instances of refusal to deal, it lays down
cost-based analyses for price-based conduct. For example, the predatory
pricing, single and multi-product rebates and margin squeeze tests, all focus
83

'EAGCP Report on An economic approach to Art. 82 (July 2005)', in.
NEELIE KROES, 'SPEECH/05/537 Preliminary Thoughts on Policy Review of
Article 82', (2005) Speech at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute,
85
DG COMPETITION, 'Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the
Treaty to exclusionary abuses', in 2005).
86
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 'Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities
in Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant
Undertakings', in,Official Journal C 045 , 24/02/2009 P. 0007 - 0020 2009).
87
Id. at ¶ 19 (citing ¶ 11 for the intended meaning of “to increase prices”: the
expression “increase prices” includes the power to maintain prices above the
competitive level and is used as shorthand for the various ways in which the
parameters of competition - such as prices, output, innovation, the variety or
quality of goods or services - can be influenced for the profit of the dominant
undertaking and to the detriment of consumers.”).
88
Id. at in. para 20
84
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on the potential for excluding equally efficient competitors by forcing such
competitors to price below cost in order to compete. Departing from the
methodology applied by the ECJ to predatory pricing in the AKZO case, 89
the Commission has moved to cost benchmarks more suitable to tackle the
peculiarities of formerly regulated markets and new high-tech industries. 90
Alas, despite the Guidance Paper’s progress in moving vertical
restraints towards a more consistent economic framework, analytical
difficulties and confusions persist. For one, it is uncertain how the
European courts will receive the Commission’s new approach. 91 More
fundamentally, there remains significant doubt as to the consistency of the
Guidance Paper’s central concept—anticompetitive foreclosure.
The trouble arises from the Commission’s insistence in the Guidance
Paper that its approach to anticompetitive foreclosure is not really new but
was already used in prior cases such as Microsoft. 92 In Microsoft, the
Commission conceded that it needed to prove foreclosure 93 and the General
Court upheld its decision. 94 The problem, however, was the construction
given to the foreclosure requirement. Microsoft argued that the claim of
foreclosure was entirely speculative, indeed, belied by a factual record
showing an increase in the number and use of alternative media players. 95
The Court, however, countered that this “practice allowed Microsoft to
obtain an unparalleled advantage with respect to the distribution of its
product and to ensure the ubiquity of Windows Media Player on client PCs
throughout the world, thus providing a disincentive for users to make use of
third-party media players and for OEMs to pre-install such players on client
PCs.” 96 Far from requiring proof of actual foreclosure, the court simply
assumed it from the nature of the practice. Should the Guidance Paper
result in an approach akin to that employed by the General Court in

89

Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359 at para 71 and 72: Prices
below Average Avoidable Costs (AAC) will presumably be illegal while Prices
above Average Avoidable Costs but below Average Total Costs (ATC) will be
illegal if they are part of a plan to exclude competitors.
90
The cost benchmarks used refer to in the paper are Average Avoidable Cost
(AAC) rather than AVC and Long Run Average Incremental Costs (LRAIC) rather
than ATC.
91
See GIORGIO MONTI, 'Article 82 EC: what future for the effects-based
approach?', (2010) 1(1), 2-11 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice,
92
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 'Antitrust: Guidance on Commission enforcement
priorities in applying Article 82 to exclusionary conduct by dominant firms –
frequently asked questions ', in MEMO 08/761 2008) at Part 1 (Why this Guidance
Paper?).
93
Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft Commission Decision [2004] at ¶¶ 841.
94
Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601 at ¶¶ 866-867.
95
Id. at ¶ 1006 (“Microsoft claims that the average number of media players per
person used each month rose from 1.5 at the end of 1999 to 2.1 in 2004. The
Commission’s contention that the number of users of Windows Media Player is
increasing is irrelevant; what matters is whether the number of users of other
formats is sufficient for content providers to find it worthwhile to encode their
products in those formats. Microsoft also disputes the relevance of the analogy
which the Commission draws with Netscape Navigator.”).
96
Id. at ¶ 1054.
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Microsoft, little progress would have been made in transitioning away from
a formalistic approach toward an economically functionalist approach.
That would be regrettable, because good economic tools for evaluating
foreclosure questions already exist within the praxis of EU competition law,
specifically in the EC’s Guidelines on non-horizontal mergers. In the
section on non-coordinated anticompetitive effects of vertical integration,
the Guidelines analyze anticompetitive foreclosure under a two-part test
consisting of a definition of foreclosure as well as its anticompetitive
component:
A merger is said to result in foreclosure where actual or potential
rivals' access to supplies or markets is hampered or eliminated as a
result of the merger, thereby reducing these companies' ability and/or
incentive to compete. Such foreclosure may discourage entry or
expansion of rivals or encourage their exit. Foreclosure thus can be
found even if the foreclosed rivals are not forced to exit the market:
It is sufficient that the rivals are disadvantaged and consequently led
to compete less effectively. Such foreclosure is regarded as anticompetitive where the merging companies—and, possibly, some of
its competitors as well—are as a result able to profitably increase the
price charged to consumers. 97
Significantly, the Guidelines distinguish between two types of
foreclosure entailing different competitive problems: input foreclosure and
customer foreclosure. While input foreclosure might result in raising rivals’
costs by restricting the access of downstream competitors to some
necessary input, customer foreclosure will occur when upstream rivals’
access to customers is precluded. However, in terms of consumer harm,
both scenarios require balancing of the efficiencies associated with the
merger and their possible anticompetitive effects. In both cases, the three
factors to be considered simultaneously will be (1) the ability and (2) the
incentives to foreclose –up or downstream– competitors, as well as (3) the
likelihood of this foreclosure to have a “significant detrimental effect on
competition” 98 where pro and anticompetitive effects will be balanced.
In the case of input foreclosure, upstream market power, while being a
pre-condition for establishing the ability to foreclose of the merged firm,
will not necessarily imply an associated incentive to foreclose the
downstream market. This follows from the fact that the incentives to
foreclose will depend on the over-all profitability of the merged firm, as
there will be a trade-off between the profits lost in the upstream market by
not selling to downstream competitors and those gained in the downstream
market from expanding sales or increasing prices. 99 High margins in the
upstream market and low ones downstream would disincentivize the firm to
97

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 'Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal
mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between
undertakings', in,Official Journal C 265 , 18/10/2008 P. 0006 - 0025 2008). At para
29
98
Id. at ¶ 32.
99
Id. at ¶ 40-41.
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enact any input foreclosure and vice versa. Therefore, an upstream
monopolist already extracting all available profits will lack the incentive to
foreclose downstream competitors regardless of its market power. On the
other hand, a firm with high downstream market shares, particularly in
combination with high margins, will be likely to benefit form increasing
rivals’ costs. Furthermore, the presence of exclusivity commitments may
represent an ambiguous factor to assess. While exclusive contracts between
the downstream merging firm and other independent input suppliers can
enhance the latter’s ability to foreclose the downstream market, the fact that
vertical integration may help to realign purchase patters freeing other input
suppliers should also be considered.
For the assessment of customer foreclosure the main concerns will also
be related with rising input prices but, in this case, as a consequence of the
incapacity of upstream actual or potential rivals to achieve minimum
efficient scale of production. This might be a result, for instance, of the
insufficient economies of scale or scope –should these be relevant–
associated with a larger client base. Moreover, the lack of expected returns
can further reduce the upstream competitor’s willingness to invest in
becoming more efficient. Nevertheless, this possible foreclosure may lead
upstream rivals to counter-strategies such as more aggressive pricing in
order to maintain sales in the downstream market. In this sense, the
incentives to engage in customer foreclosure will again depend on its overall profitability. Accordingly, a less efficient upstream division of the
integrated firm will entail higher costs of diverting input from other
suppliers. Further, the higher the market share of the downstream division,
the more the benefits to be captured from an increase in downstream prices
as a result of the raise of upstream rivals’ costs. 100
In sum, the Guidelines represent a comprehensive functionalist analysis
of the conditions and effects of anticompetitive foreclosure. This implies
not only that all associated efficiencies are specifically recognized by and
generally referred to in the framework of vertical integration, but also that
the positive effects of practices such as tying and bundling are taken into
account in analyzing conglomerate mergers. 101
Unfortunately, the Guidelines’ approach ends with mergers. In
principle, nothing prevents the application of the economically rigorous
Guidelines approach to the question of likely foreclosure from vertical or
conglomerate integration, but then the subsequent application of very
different analytical criteria under either Article 101 or 102 to the question
of whether the recently merged firm is engaging in exclusionary vertical
restraints. Under current EU principles, analytically indistinct foreclosure
questions may be analyzed very differently depending on the happenstance
of whether they are classified as mergers, anticompetitive agreements, or an
abuse of dominance.

100

Id. at ¶ 69-70.
Id. at ¶ 93 (“Tying and bundling as such are common practices that often have
no anticompetitive consequences. Companies engage in tying and bundling in order
to provide their customers with better products or offerings in cost-effective
ways.”).
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Like its US analogue, EU competition law already contains most of the
analytical resources necessary for a coherent exclusionary vertical restraints
policy. Also as in the US, EU law applies these analytical resources
sporadically and inconsistently. Both systems stand in dire need of
economic systematization.
III. A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING
EXCLUSIONARY VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
Properly understood, all instances of exclusionary vertical restraints—
whatever their form—are anticompetitive because they foreclose the
opportunity of some rival of one of the contracting parties—whether the
party granting or receiving the discount—to operate efficiently in the
relevant market. At its core, all exclusionary vertical restraints analysis
should converge upon a simple pairing of concepts: foreclosure and
substantiality. The first question to be answered is whether the contractual
practice at issue forecloses any portion of the relevant market. If it does
not, the analysis should be at an end and the contractual practice lawful. If
the contractual practice does foreclose some share of the relevant market,
the next question is whether the share of the market foreclosed is
substantial. Here, substantiality should be given an economic, functional
definition: foreclosure is “substantial,” and hence prima facie unlawful, if
it denies rivals a reasonable opportunity to compete for resources (whether
customers or inputs) that would be necessary for the rival’s efficient
operation in the market.
A. Foreclosure
We take as our point of departure an oft-cited observation from thenJudge Breyer’s opinion in Barry Wright v. ITT Grinnell 102 that “virtually
every contract to buy ‘forecloses’ or ‘excludes’ alternative sellers from
some portion of the market, namely the portion consisting of what was
bought.” 103 Since all contracts “foreclose,” “we are to take into account
both the extent of the foreclosure and the buyer’s and seller’s business
justifications for the arrangement.” 104 The apparent import of such an
analytical approach would be to eliminate any independent importance for
the foreclosure element of exclusionary vertical restraints cases and reduce
the analysis to the substantiality prong.
Such was surely not Judge Breyer’s intention. In an earlier part of the
opinion, Breyer rejected the plaintiff’s claim that Pacific Scientific’s
discounts were below-cost and therefore predatory. 105 Once Breyer found
the discounts to be above cost (both incremental and total), he concluded

102

Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983).
Id. at 236.
104
Id. at 236-37.
105
Id. at 231-36.
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that the price cut could “not be found anticompetitive or exclusionary,”106
regardless of how much of the market was affected. In other words, Breyer
refused to perform a substantiality function on the price discounting claim
unless it was first found to “foreclose” some share of the market by making
it impossible for competitors to match the defendant’s prices.
Properly understood, the foreclosure prong of “substantial foreclosure”
analysis should serve an independent threshold function. It should serve to
make potentially unlawful only those vertical restraints that prevent
competitors from competing on the merits. To state it somewhat more
formally, a contract or contractual provision should be deemed to
“foreclose” some share of the market only when it prevents an equally
efficient competitor from profitably offering its own set of contractual
terms that the customer reasonably might chose in lieu of the defendant’s
terms for some increment of the market’s output. We shall refer to this
interpretation of “foreclosure” as the “reasonable sales opportunity” test.
Under our formulation of the test, unlike in the above-quoted language
from Barry Wright, most run-of-the-mill contracts would not foreclose at
all. Suppose that the defendant offers to sell a customer 100 tons of coal,
which constitute the customers’ coal requirements for the next year.
Following the Barry Wright formulation, one could say that the contract,
once accepted, “forecloses” rivals’ ability to makes sales to that customer
for the year, since it will not care to purchase any further coal once it has
satisfied its requirements. But if other sellers in the market had a
reasonable opportunity to bid for the same business and simply lost the bid
because their own bids were less attractive to the buyer, then it is not
sensible to speak of the contract as “foreclosing” any business at all. Under
our reasonable sales opportunity test, since every other seller in the market
was reasonably able to compete for the same business, there is no
foreclosure.
Under our interpretation of foreclosure, not even every exclusive
dealing contract forecloses a portion of the market. If an exclusive dealing
contract covers a sufficiently small, and hence contestable, share of the
market such that any rival in the market could reasonably offer its own
exclusive dealing contract, there is no foreclosure. Suppose, for example,
that defendant offered an exclusive supply relationship for all of the buyer’s
requirements for a two year period. The buyer’s share of the market is 2%.
If even small rivals of the competitor are able to offer a competitive
exclusive deal for a two-year period that has a reasonable chance of being
accepted, then we would not deem the contract to foreclose any of the
market.
As just discussed, a vertical relationship such as a contract or sale may
not foreclose rivals if the rivals had a reasonable opportunity to compete for
the customer’s business before the consummation of the contract or sale.
The “every contract forecloses” maxim is also capable of confusing things
in another sense—with respect to the rival’s opportunities after its
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Id. at 236.
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competitor has contracted with, or sold to, the customer. The “every
contract forecloses” maxim assumes a circumstance where the customer is
willing to purchase only a fixed unit of the good or service from a single
seller, as might be the case of a commuter shopping for an automobile or a
retiree looking for a lawyer to prepare her will.
But, in many
circumstances, the customer may be willing to purchase generally
substitutionary goods from multiple suppliers, assuming that the goods are
not perfect substitutes and the marginal utility provided by each purchase
exceeds the customer’s reservation price. In such circumstances, the first
contract of sale may diminish the likelihood that the customer will purchase
the second good, but not foreclose it altogether since the second seller may
still have an opportunity to demonstrate that the marginal utility of the
second purchase makes it worth the customer’s while.
It is important to keep this latter qualification in mind, since
exclusionary vertical restraints challenges often occur in markets where a
dominant incumbent has longstanding relationships with most of the major
customers in the market and a new entrant is unlikely quickly to persuade
customers to abandon their dealing with the incumbent. If the new entrant
has a reasonable opportunity to make sales to customer that do not replace
the incumbent sales—and, hence, to expand the market—the incumbent’s
vertical relationships have no foreclosing effect. To give an illustration,
Nielsen Media Research is at present the sole supplier of syndicated
television audience ratings in most local television markets. However, until
its exit from the business in 1993, Arbitron (which currently supplies radio
ratings) competed with Nielsen in local television ratings. 107 During much
of the time that the two companies competed in local television ratings,
substantially over half of all local television stations purchased ratings from
both Arbitron and Nielsen. 108 As to these customers, at least, neither
supplier’s vertical relationship had even an ex post foreclosing effect on the
other supplier since the customers were willing to purchase both
companies’ offering.
Of course, exclusive contracts entered into by dominant firms often do
foreclose competitors. For example, suppose that customers view it as
indispensable to carry at least some of the dominant firm’s products on their
shelves. In that context, small rivals may not have a reasonable opportunity
to match the dominant firm’s exclusive offer, since they cannot compete
over the non-contestable portion of the dominant firm’s sales. 109 Or, the
dominant firm’s exclusive offer may be for such a very large piece of
business that smaller rivals are unable to offer a comparable supply
commitment. Or the dominant firm may have locked up the market in long-
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H.M. BEVILLE, JR., AUDIENCE RATINGS 64-66 (1988); Business Wire, Arbitron
Discontinues Syndicated Television & Ratings Service, (Oct. 18, 1993).
108
Broadcasting & Cable, Ailing Oligopoly: TV Station Ratings Business (April 23
1990) (reporting that in top 50 markets percentage of stations subscribing to both
Nielsen and Arbitron had declined from 80 to 60 percent);
109
We return to the idea of “non-contestable” shares and “unavoidable trading
partners” with our discussion of the Intel case in Part IV(A).
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term exclusive contracts before the new rivals entered the market, in which
case they did not have a reasonable chance of entering into ex ante
competition for the contract. These are all examples of circumstances
where a rival might be able to demonstrate the absence of a reasonable sales
opportunity for a particular portion of the market, and hence some degree of
foreclosure.
Foreclosure can arise from a wide variety of vertical contractual
practices. In particular, both price and non-price contractual terms can
deny rivals reasonable sales opportunities. We have already seen examples
of non-price contractual terms—such as exclusivity commitments—that
foreclose. Similarly, some tying arrangements—where the buyer must
purchase from the defendant a product that it otherwise might purchase
from another supplier if the customer wishes to purchase a monopoly
product sold by the defendant—foreclose equally efficient rivals. But a
wide variety of predatory or discriminatory discounting and rebating
functions can have similar effects.
The most obvious example of a “foreclosing” pricing policy is a
predatory price. When a dominant firm offers buyers a below-cost price,
equally efficient rivals are unable to compete for sales to any customers
offered the predatory prices. The same is true of bundled discount schemes
that do not result in a predatory price on the package, but would require a
competitor that sold only one of the products covered by the bundle to offer
a below-cost price in order to make the customers willing to accept the
rival’s offer and thereby forego the package discounts. 110 Conversely, if
the rival is able to match the bundled discounts by giving an equivalent
discount in the competitive market and doing so without having to price
below cost, then the rival is not foreclosed from making a sale. 111 Thus,
although single-product predatory pricing and bundled discounting require
somewhat different computations to determine whether the equally efficient
rival would be foreclosed from selling above cost in response to the
dominant firm’s pricing offer, 112 the foreclosure question to be asked in
both cases is analytically identical.
The same observation should also hold for secondary line price
discrimination. If a manufacturer charges different wholesale prices to two
competitor retailers, the discriminatory price could make it impossible for
the disadvantaged firm profitably to meet its competitor’s price to
downstream customers. In such a circumstance, the reasonable sales
opportunity test would hold that the discriminatory price resulted in
foreclosure of a percentage of the market corresponding with the volume of
the goods sold to the advantaged retailer. Conversely, if the discriminatory
price merely made sales more profitable for one retailer than another, it
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See, e.g., Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir.
2008).
111
Id.
112
See Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare,
55 Emory L. J. 423 (2006).
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would not foreclose the retailer’s sales opportunity in the downstream
market.
Tying arrangements can also create foreclosure, as the general test for
tying already recognizes. 113 If the seller has market power in the tying
product and requires the seller to purchase the tied product if it wants to
purchase the tying product, then rivals who make only the tying product
may be denied a reasonable opportunity to compete for some segment of
sales in the tied market. Conversely, where all firms selling in the tied
market also make sales in the tying market, the tying practice results in no
foreclosure since firms can respond to the tying firm’s tied demand by
offering their own package sales of both products.
We have focused thus far on foreclosure of customers, but the same test
can be applied—with only a slightly different form of words—to input
foreclosure. 114 Instead of a reasonable sales opportunity test, we would ask
whether the practice—whether exclusive input acquisition, predatory
overbidding, or other input-oriented restraint—denied rivals a reasonable
purchase opportunity. For example, an output agreement that commits a
supplier to sell all of its output to a particular buyer should not be deemed
to foreclose if rivals had a reasonable opportunity to compete for the output
contract. Conversely, if rivals could not reasonably compete for the output
contract, for example because their own requirements were likely to be
smaller than the seller’s output, then we would find the presence of
foreclosure and move to the substantiality prong.
B. Substantiality
Foreclosure is not, by itself, concerning. Although we disagree with
Judge Breyer’s broad dictum that every contract forecloses, many forms of
ordinary commercial contract meet our reasonable sales opportunity test
and hence foreclose. Nonetheless, foreclosure should not be considered
problematic unless it is “substantial,” or “anticompetitive” in EU terms.
Substantiality in this context should be given a functional, economic
definition.
Once a plaintiff has identified practices that “foreclose” competitors, it
is necessary to ascertain whether the foreclosure accounts for such a large
percentage of the market that the survival of rivals is threatened. The
foreclosure percentage may arise from a single practice or from the
cumulative effect of several foreclosing practices. For example, a dominant
firm might use a combination of tying contracts covering 20% of the
market, predatory prices covering another 30% of the market, and exclusive
dealing contracts covering yet another 10% of the market to foreclose 60%
of the market. 115 In such a case, the same substantiality question should be
113

Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16 (discussing foreclosure requirement).
Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J.
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asked as in a case where a single practice foreclosed 60% of the market.
The form of foreclosure should not affect the determination of
substantiality.
Extant case law provides little economically useful analytical tools on
the meaning of substantiality. Take, for example, the leading articulation in
the seminal Tampa Electric case:
To determine substantiality in a given case, it is necessary to
weigh the probable effect of the contract on the relevant area of
effective competition, taking into account the relative strength of
the parties, the proportionate volume of commerce involved in
relation to the total volume of commerce in the relevant market
area, and the probable immediate and future effects which preemption of that share of the market might have on effective
competition therein. 116
US and EU courts and competition authorities typically fall back on
percentages, holding for example that “foreclosure levels of less than 30 or
40 percent are not a substantial share.” 117 But such market share numbers,
picked from the air, are utterly arbitrary from an economic perspective.
Whether foreclosure is “substantial” in an economic sense depends on
whether the quantity of the foreclosure prevents rivals from functioning
efficiently in the market. Ten percent foreclosure might be enough to drive
competitors out of one market whereas foreclosure of seventy percent might
be perfectly consistent with vibrant competition in another.
In keeping with our reasonable sales opportunity definition of
foreclosure, we propose a “reasonable survival opportunity” test for
substantiality. Under this test, market foreclosure is not problematic unless
an equally efficient rival would lack a reasonable opportunity to obtain a
sufficient share of the non-foreclosed portion of the market to reach
minimum viable scale.
The first step in the substantiality analysis is to identify the minimum
viable scale necessary to compete in the market. Minimum viable scale, a
familiar concept from horizontal merger analysis, 118 equals the total sales a
116

Tampa Elec., 365 U.S. at 329. Under EU law very similar elements are
suggested to evaluate anticompetitive foreclosure. See supra footnote xxx.
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E.g., Midwest Agency Servs., Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, No. 09-165DCR, 2010 WL 935450, at *6 (E.D. Ky. March 11, 2010). On the European side,
see the recent decision of the European Commission on the Case COMP 39.386—
Long Term Electricity Contracts France (2010).
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In the U.S., minimum viable scale has also been used in telecommunications
regulation. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In Europe
several instruments use the concept of minimum efficient scale in order to perform
a foreclosure assessment. See the Commission Communication—Notice—
Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, ¶ 76; Commission
Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers Under the Council
Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings ¶ 63;
Commission Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying
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new entrant would need to reach its hurdle rate (a sufficient rate of return to
justify the investment) on its invested capital. 119 So long as a firm is
operating at or above minimum viable scale, foreclosure of some
percentage of the market does not threaten its market participation, even if
it frustrates its ability to expand. However, partial market foreclosure
strategies can eliminate a competitor’s presence from the market altogether,
particularly where fixed costs account for a very large percentage of total
costs and firms therefore need a significant share of the market in order to
cover their fixed costs. 120 For example, the computer operating systems
market is characterized by increasing returns to scale and high fixed costs,
hence by foreclosing even just a portion of the market, Microsoft may have
been able to prevent new entry by equally (or more) efficient rivals. 121
It should be noted that the relationship between minimum viable scale
and the non-foreclosed share of the market depends on whether sales in the
market are static, expanding, or shrinking. In an expanding market,
minimum viable scale expressed as a percentage of the market will shrink
over time whereas in a contracting market it will expand. Further, the
entrant of a new firm into the market may have effects on the size of the
market, to the extent that it is measured by revenues rather than units. 122
The entry of a new brand often evoke a drop in the equilibrium prices of
existing brands in the market, 123 which means that the new entrant may
have to fight for a piece of a shrinking pie.
Once a plaintiff identifies minimum viable scale and translates the
revenue required into a market share percentage, the next substantiality
question is to identify the probability that an equally efficient competitor in
head-to-head competition with the defendant or other rivals in the market
would secure a sufficient amount of business in the contestable (i.e., non-

Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant
Undertakings, ¶ 16. See also Case C-209/07, Competition Authority v. Beef Indus.
Dev. Society Ltd. and Barry Bros. (Carrigmore) Meats Ltd. (2008), ECRI-0837 ¶
32.
119
See Steven C. Salop, Measuring Ease of Entry, 31 Antitrust Bull. 551, 563
(1986).
120
See, e.g., Christodoulos Stefanadis, Selective Contracts, Foreclosure, and the
Chicago School View, 41 J. L. & Econ. 429, 445-46 (1998); see also Willard K.
Tom, David A. Balto & Neil Averitt, Anticompetitive Aspects of Market-Share
Discounts and Other Incentives to Exclusive Dealing, 67 Antitrust L. J. 615, 62526 (2000) (offering examples of foreclosure strategies that deny rivals ability to
reach minimum viable scale).
121
Id.
122
U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines § 1.41 (1992) (explaining that market share is to be measured by
“[d]ollar sales or shipments . . . if firms are distinguished primarily by
differentiation of their products” and by “[u]nit sales . . . if firms are distinguished
primarily on the basis of their relative advantages in serving different buyers or
groups of buyers”).
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Suman Basroy & Dung Nguyen, Multinomial Logit Market Share Models:
Equilibrium Characteristics and Strategic Implications, 44 Mang. Science 1396,
1396 (1998).
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foreclosed) portion of the market to meet its minimum viable scale.
Sometimes, the rival or rivals are already operating at minimum viable
scale despite the foreclosure, in which case the answer to the substantiality
question is easy. But many vertical restraints cases concern markets with a
longstanding dominant incumbent and a new entrant that has not yet
reached minimum viable scale.
Such cases require making some
assessment about an equally efficient competitor’s likelihood of success in
the non-foreclosed segment of the market.
In most case, that analysis requires an assessment of the probability that
customers will switch from the incumbent supplier to the new entrant.
Even in the non-foreclosed portion of the market, new entrants often face a
considerable disadvantage in competing for business given entrenched
brand preferences, loyalty to existing suppliers, and switching costs. 124
These incumbency advantages could potentially result in even small
amounts of foreclosure excluding new entrants, since the new entrant’s
chances of winning business in the non-foreclosed segment of the market
are low.
Suppose, for example, a market in a defendant monopolist has
exclusive contracts foreclosing 60% of the market. Let minimum viable
scale be equal to a 10% market share. Is the market substantially foreclosed
to an equally efficient new entrant? In order to enter efficiently, a new firm
must secure 10% of the market’s business out of an available 40%. Put that
way, it seems that the foreclosure is not substantial, because if we assign an
equal probability to bidding success by the incumbent and the equally
efficient new entrant, the new entrant should expect to obtain a 20% market
share. But the new entrant’s prospects for winning business in head-tohead competition with the incumbent may very well be less than 50%. For
one, even in the non-foreclosed segment of the market, buyers may have
strong loyalties to the incumbent firm or aversion to experimenting with a
new supplier. If, for example, the new entrant’s likelihood of winning new
business in head-to-head competitive bidding is only 20%, then the new
entrant should not expect that it will be able to reach minimum efficient
scale upon entry. In that case, the foreclosure might be said to be
substantial.
But it would be a mistake to find the presence of substantial foreclosure
simply by focusing on the new entrant’s probable market share following
the first round of competition in the non-foreclosed portion of the market.
Very few new entrants achieve minimum viable scale immediately upon
entry. 125 Incumbency advantages erode over time, often quite rapidly.
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See LEE G. COOPER & MASAO NAKANISHI, MARKET SHARE ANALYSIS 56-57
(1988).
125
For example, in developing vertical integration rules for the cable television
industry, the Federal Communications Commission defined the minimum viable
scale of a television network based on the number of subscribers a network must
have after five years in the market in order to have a 70 percent chance of survival.
In re Comm’n’s Cable Horizontal & Vertical Ownership Limits, Fourth Report and
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Assume, for example, a market for widgets with a single monopolist,
minimum viable scale equal to twenty percent of the market, a 90%
incumbency advantage, and monthly purchase decisions by customers.
Further assume that the market is stable, consists of 2,000 units, and that
fifty percent of the market is foreclosed. The chart below reflects the
market share change in the non-foreclosed portion of the market on a
monthly basis.
Even with the strong incumbency advantage and
foreclosure of half the market, the new entrant reaches minimum viable
scale by eight months and essential market share parity in the nonforeclosed segment by the end of the first year.

Market Share Change with 90% Incumbency Advantage and
Monthly Customer Decision
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As a general rule, we would propose that foreclosure should not be
deemed substantial if the minimum viable scale is less than the units or
revenues 126 in the non-foreclosed segment of the market divided by the
number of competitors. Thus, for example, in our earlier example of a
market with 50% foreclosure, minimum viable scale equal to 20%, and an
incumbent monopolist and one new entrant, there would be no substantial
foreclosure as a matter of law.
Our proposed rule has the effect of disregarding incumbency
advantages and assuming that, over time, the new entrant has an equal
chance of winning business as every other competitor. Several important
qualifications are necessary.
First, a generic application of this rule might lead to a false positive—
an erroneous finding of substantial foreclosure—if the new entrant’s actual
probability of winning exceeds its generic probability of winning. Indeed,
far from arguing that the incumbent has an incumbency advantage, new
entrants often argue that, but for the foreclosure, they would quickly gain
market share since they would enter the market with a superior product or
lower price than the incumbent. In private damages cases, the plaintiff’s
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 23 FCC Rcd. 2134, ¶¶ 55-57
(2008).
126
See supra n. xxx.
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damages model often assumes that, but for the foreclosure, the plaintiff
would have rapidly gained a large market share. 127 Courts and agencies
should take into account—perhaps with a grain of salt—the rival’s often
self-serving claims about its product’s superiority in determining the
necessary space for competition.
Second, in markets with very long intervals between competitive
cycles, for example because there are few customers or long-term contracts,
incumbency advantages may take a long time to wear off. In such cases, it
may be necessary to relax the assumption that the new entrant has an equal
probability of winning business in the unforeclosed segment of the market.
Nonetheless, the analysis should remain bounded by realistic assumptions
about the rival’s probability of winning and the time-frame necessary for a
new entrant to reach its hurdle rate on capital.
Third, partially foreclosed markets with multiple competitive firms
raise a number of special issues. In the Standard Stations case, 128 Standard
Oil’s exclusive dealing contracts amounted to only 6.7% of retail sales in
the relevant gasoline distribution market, yet the aggregate effect of the all
of the seven “majors’” exclusive dealing contracts may have been to
foreclose 67% of the overall market. 129 None of the seven majors was
foreclosed from the market, of course, but perhaps the exclusives presented
entry barriers to new entrants who could not reasonably expect to achieve
minimum viable scale given the opportunity to compete for 23% of the
market’s business.
Although we are skeptical that the exclusive contracts in Standard
Stations diminished the market’s competitiveness, we would cautiously
recognize the possibility of cumulative foreclosure in other cases. In such
cases, the baseline principle of substantiality—that foreclosure should not
be deemed substantial if the minimum viable scale is less than the units or
revenues in the non-foreclosed segment of the market divided by the
number of competitive firms in the market—should continue to apply.
Although increasing the denominator could lead to excessively liberal
findings of substantiality, markets that already exhibit a number of
competitive firms should be characterized by low minimum viable scales,
thus limiting the potential size of the numerator. In Standard Stations, for
example, the seven majors amounted to about 67% of all retail sales, but the
remainder was fragmented between seventy small companies. 130 The
presence of a number of smaller firms in the market will often provide
market-tested data on minimum viable scale and discipline plaintiffs’
claims that a large scale is necessary to compete in the market.
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See Richard C. Hoyt, Dale C. Dahl, and Stuart D. Gibson, Comprehensive
Models for Assessing Lost Profits to Antitrust Plaintiffs, 60 Minn.L.Rev. 1233
(1976).
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Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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See Friedrich Kessler & Richard H. Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical
Integration, 69 Yale L. J. 1, 29-30 (1959).
130
337 U.S. at 295.
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Further, where multiple firms in the market employ similar vertical
restraints—such as exclusive dealing contracts or other types of loyaltyinducing provisions—the vertical restraints are more likely to be
manifestations of competition than exclusion. While a pattern of vertical
restraints by separate firms may be anticompetitive, that is most likely to be
the case when the vertical restraints are being used to cartelize an industry,
in which case a separate analytical framework should come into play. 131 It
would be very unusual to observe firms in an oligopolistic market
employing vertical restraints to exclude new entrants without also colluding
with each other. Individually, the firms would lack market power and
therefore could not foist undesirable restrictions on customers. So if the
firms individually sought to induce their customers to agree to terms that
would exclude new entrants, they would have to pay the customers to agree
to such terms, for example by giving discounts or other inducements. The
firms would be spending money to exclude new entrants, and each dollar
they spent in the campaign would redound to the benefit of their existing
competitors as well. 132 A far more likely interpretation in such a situation
is that vertical restraints are part of the currency of competition.
As with the foreclosure element, the substantiality element applies
equally in customer foreclosure and input foreclosure cases. Input
foreclosure can raise a rival’s costs, for example by forcing the rival to
purchase inferior or more expensive resources. 133 Such effects threaten the
competitiveness of the market when they threaten to prevent the rival from
selling profitably at a scale necessary to remain a competitive force. Hence,
in input foreclosure cases, we would ask whether the foreclosure is so
severe that rivals lack a reasonable opportunity to survive in the market, as
determined by their ability to cover their hurdle rate on capital.
****
It bears repeating that we have articulated a two-part prima facie test
for exclusionary vertical restraints, not a comprehensive framework for
assessing legality in every vertical restraints case. In particular, we have
not dealt with efficiencies defenses, which are generally considered an
affirmative defense by the defendant after the plaintiff has made out an
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See supra Part IA.
Even in a fairly concentrated oligopoly, it is relatively unlikely that an
individual firm would expend resources to exclude or marginalize a rival if any
benefit would be widely shared with the other oligopolists. In Brooke Group, for
example, the Supreme Court found it implausible that a firm with an 11-12% share
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Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 Yale L. J. 209 (1986).
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affirmative case of foreclosure. 134 The twin principles of foreclosure and
substantiality should serve as an overarching screen in the full variety of
exclusionary vertical restraints cases.
Where the plaintiff fails to
demonstrate substantial foreclosure—as will be true in many vertical
restraints challenges—there is no call to analyze efficiencies. 135
IV. THREE ILLUSTRATIONS
In the previous section, we proposed a unified prima facie test for all
exclusionary restraints that requires a showing that the restraint forecloses a
substantial share of the relevant market. In this section, we illustrate our
proposed test with three recent cases in which application of our framework
could have improved the agency or court’s analysis. The three cases
illustrate three sorts of vertical restraint circumstances: (1) customer
foreclosure; (2) input foreclosure; and (3) multi-product foreclosure.
A. Customer Foreclosure: Intel/AMD
On August 4, 2010 Intel and the Federal Trade Commission announced
the settlement of the FTC’s antitrust enforcement action. 136 The FTC
settlement was the final major chapter in Intel’s decade-long antitrust war
with Advanced Micro Devices (“AMD”) its major rival in the global
microprocessor market. Prior episodes included a settlement with the
Japanese Fair Trade Commission, 137 an approximately $20 million fine by
the Korean Fair Trade Commission, 138 a $1.25 billion dollar payment by
Intel to settle AMD’s private antitrust lawsuit, 139 and a € 1.06 billion
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See U.S. v. Microsoft, 253 U.S. 34, 59-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (setting
out mutli-part test for monopolization offenses, in which pro-competitive
justifications are an affirmative defense to be proven by the defendant).
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There is a substantial literature on the efficiencies justifications for various
kinds of vertical restraints. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy,
Exclusive Dealing Intensifies Competition for Distribution, 75 Antitrust L. J. 433,
437 (2008) (examining role of exclusive shelf space contracts in elasticizing
demand facing manufacturers and hence in driving down consumer prices); David
S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from
Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 Yale J. Reg. 37 (2005)
(explaining bunding and tying practices as manifestations of product-specific scale
economies); Jan B. Heide, Shantanu Dutta & Mark Bergen, Exclusive Dealing and
Business Efficiency: Evidence from Industry Practice, 41 J.L. & Econ. 387 (1998)
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Dec. 16, 2009),
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Corrective Measures Against Intel’s Abuse of Market Dominance,
http://eng.ftc.go.kr/files/bbs/2008/Intel%20Case(08.6.)1.pdf.
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Steve Lohr & James Kanter, A.M.D.-Intel Settlement Won’t End their Woes,
New
York
Times
(Nov.
12,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/technology/companies/13chip.html.
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(almost $1.5 billion) fine by the European Commission, 140 the highest it
had ever imposed. 141 Intel continues to challenge the EC decision in the
European General Court. The EC decision is notable for its length—518
pages—although the publicly available version has redacted confidential
facts. For all its detail, however, the EC analysis omits an essential
ingredient of an exclusionary vertical restraints case—evidence that the
relevant restraints “substantially” foreclosed the relevant market by denying
AMD the opportunity to reach minimum viable scale.
Intel and AMD produce microprocessors and compete to supply
Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), companies like (Dell, Hewlitt
Packard, NEC, Acer and Lenovo) that produce personal and business
computers. Their corporate history is at the origin of multiple disputes
concerning intellectual property rights. 142 In the early 1980s, IBM chose
Intel to manufacture the Central Processing Units (CPUs) for IBM’s
Personal Computers (PCs). However, it only did so on the condition that
Intel would license its technology to a second source provider—AMD. The
IBM agreement resulted in Intel’s CPU (x86) becoming the de facto
industry standard. Shortly after the IBM agreement, AMD began to
complain that Intel was not providing the information necessary for AMD
to manufacture its new generation of microprocessors, which allegedly
allowed Intel to consolidate its power in the market. 143 After years of
litigation, Intel was obliged to provide AMD with its x86 technology.
1995, AMD started to move beyond merely copying Intel’s
microprocessors, attempting to compete on both technology and price. On
the innovation front, AMD designed the first 64-bit microprocessor. 144 On
the price front, Intel has a historic higher Average Selling Price (ASP) per
unit, which it justifies as the result of better quality and performance. 145 The
companies have followed significantly different investment strategies. Intel
invested heavily in new billion-dollars manufacturing facilities (called
“fabs”) with a view to expanding output in order to meet its market share
objectives. AMD opted to concentrate its capital investments in research
and development, and outsourced the manufacture of its
microprocessors. 146 In the market for x86 microprocessors, Intel has had a
market share around 80 for the last decade whereas AMD’s has usually
hovered between 15 and 20%. 147
140
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AMD alleged that, beginning in the late 1990s, Intel employed a variety
of exclusionary contractual practices with OEMs and retailers to slow
AMD’s market share growth. Intel’s granted the major OEMs all-unit
rebates and marketing payments in order to promote Intel based computers.
It also directly or indirectly granted important retailers (such as
Mediamarkt, in Europe), promotional payments for the promotion of its
products. 148 These rebates were allegedly associated with different degrees
of exclusivity commitments. AMD also accused Intel of imposing “naked
restrictions” consisting of payments to major OEMs for delaying or
cancelling the launching of AMD based computers or as establishing
certain restrictions on their distribution. 149
Building upon these facts, the European Commission’s decision
provided an unofficial application of its new economic approach to
dominance 150 that unfortunately failed to solve the ambiguities and
inconsistencies identified in the previous section. 151 The Commission got
off to a bad start. As in the only previous decision dealing with similar
practices in the framework of the new economic approach to Article 102,
Tomra, 152 the Commission started by denying any need to show market
foreclosure in Article 102 cases, in general, and in loyalty rebate cases, in
particular, on the authority of prior case law including HoffmannLaRoche. 153 Despite tipping its hat to the old form-based approach, the
Commission then declared that it would perform an economically oriented
anticompetitive foreclosure analysis after all.
For simplicity, we focus here on the Commission’s treatment of Intel’s
de facto exclusivity rebates. Early in its decision, the Commission seemed
to express categorical hostility to exclusivity rebates noting that “customers
which, on the basis only of competition on the merits, may have awarded a
part of their purchases to a competing supplier, may prefer to source all or
nearly all of their inputs from the dominant company in order to obtain the
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benefit of the discount.” 154 Later, however, the Commission discussed the
possibility of using a test proposed by the Guidance Paper and popular in
the US: “one possible way of examining whether exclusivity rebates are
capable or likely to cause anticompetitive foreclosure is to conduct an as
efficient competitor analysis.” 155 The “equally efficient competitor” test is
intended to assess whether the dominant firm itself would survive, given its
cost-structure, if it had to respond to the challenged pricing structures. 156
Since most the challenged rebating practices were single-product (i.e.,
bundling claims were not a issue), the Commission could not take the
position that AMD was unable to compete with Intel over the full range of
CPU sales. Thus, in order to find that Intel’s rebate foreclosed AMD, the
Commission made a finding that Intel was an “unavoidable trading partner”
for most of the major OEMs. 157 In other words, since some core group of
the OEM’s customers demanded Intel microprocessors in their computers,
the OEM had to do at least some of its business with Intel. This meant that
less than 100% of these OEM’s purchases were “contestable” in a
competition between Intel and AMD. Hence, found the Commission, when
Intel offered a loyalty rebate spread over all of the OEM’s CPU
requirements, AMD could only attempt to match that rebate over some
fraction of the OEM’s requirements. 158 If, in order to match Intel’s loyalty
rebate, AMD would be forced to price below cost in the contestable
segment, then an equally efficient competitor to Intel would be foreclosed
from selling to that customer.
Much of the disagreement between Intel and the Commission on the
application of the equally efficient competitor test concerned what
constitutes an avoidable cost within the measurement of Average Avoidable
Costs (AAC) i.e. the measure of cost used for to use in assessing whether
would have to price below cost in order to match Intel’s rebates. 159 That
controversy is beyond the scope of this paper. The Commission found that,
as to a number of OEMs, at least some portion of the OEM’s business was
foreclosed to AMD by Intel’s rebates, and we accept that finding as
legitimate for the sake of argument.
The problem with the Commission’s analysis is that it essentially
stopped at foreclosure and failed to consider whether the foreclosure was
substantial in an economically meaningful sense. Significantly, there was
no finding that AMD was shut out of the market—indeed, from the late
1990s to 2009 its market share grew from about ten percent to about twenty
percent. 160 Further, the Commission could not have found that Intel’s
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rebates foreclosed AMD’s access to even the major OEMs, since AMD
made significant sales to most of the major OEMs. 161
What sort of evidence, then, should have sufficed to show that whatever
sales were foreclosed to AMD were sufficiently important that they affected
AMD’s viability in the market? The Commission stressed that the
microprocessor industry is characterized by output expansion, rapid
innovation, falling prices, 162 and high barriers for entry and expansion 163 as
a result of the necessary R&D investments, brand image, and fabs. 164 From
this, the Commission believed that high net margins and economies of scale
are crucial for survival. 165 Recently, several smaller competitors exited the
market. 166 In combination, these factors provided evidence that the market
was susceptible to monopolization, but they did not show that any
foreclosure of AMD from a particular segment of the market threatened
AMD’s viability. Indeed, for much of the relevant period, AMD reported
positive operating income. 167 Although we are unable to reach a firm
conclusion from the publicly available data, it seems unlikely that a
generally profitable and innovative company with a growing market share
could claim that it was substantially foreclosed from the market.
Rather than attempting to prove that the foreclosure was substantial
insofar as it threatened AMD’s ability to remain a viable and innovative
presence in the market, the Commission focused on the impact of Intel’s
loyalty rebates on customer choice. 168 The Commission believed the
foreclosure of AMD from a segment of an OEM’s business harmed
consumers because it diminished the variety of purchasing options they
faced, even if it did not increase their prices. 169 Thus, some computer users
who would have preferred an AMD microprocessor to an Intel
microprocessor would find their preference thwarted by virtue of the fact
that the retailer they visited would offer them only an Intel microprocessor.
This argument fails to give sufficient weight to the interests of
consumers in lower prices and the incentives of the OEMs to promote the
consumer interest. As long as AMD remains a viable presence in the
market, the OEMs must weigh Intel’s discount and rebate offers as a tradeoff between a real price reduction (as opposed to a temporary predatory
price cut to be followed by supracompetitive monopoly prices following
AMD’s ouster from the market) and diminution in the variety they can offer
their customers. Assuming a competitive computer market, the OEM’s
profit-maximizing strategy will be to select the decision—lower price or
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greater variety—that increases its market share by satisfying customer
demand. If the OEM decides to forgo variety for price, this will usually be
because customers, in the aggregate, would prefer lower prices to greater
variety. Examples of similar trade-offs abound in the economic literature.
For instance, Klein and Murphy have shown that retailers, by giving
manufacturers exclusive shelf-space deals, are able to elasticize the demand
facing the manufacturer by eliminating idiosyncratic variety preferences
and hence exact lower wholesale prices from the manufacturers. 170 While
some customers with strong variety preferences may face net welfare
losses, consumers as a class generally gain from the lower prices. 171
Throughout the period relevant to the Intel/AMD saga, microprocessor
prices to final consumers plummeted. According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, in recent years prices relative to performance have dropped more
precipitously for microprocessors than for any other of the 1,200 product
categories the Bureau tracks. 172 This evidence is at odds with a finding that
Intel impaired AMD’s ability to function in the market.
The Commission’s Intel decision shows significant progress by
engaging in a rigorous foreclosure analysis. Alas, it stops with the first half
of the story. Foreclosure in our sense—the denial of a reasonable sales
opportunity—is endemic in many highly competitive markets. Without
analysis of substantiality, however, it fails to provide a satisfactory answer
to the questions competition policy is meant to address.
B. Input Foreclosure: Apple/Orange France
A good example of the need to systematize the European approach to
exclusionary vertical restraints and anticompetitive input foreclosure
appears in the French Competition Authority’s recent enforcement action
against Apple and Orange France. 173 Apple, the manufacturer of the
iPhone, and Orange France—a provider of phone services in France and
several other European countries—agreed that Orange France would be the
exclusive distributor of the iPhone to the French market for a five-year
170
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for Distribution, 75 Antitrust L. J. 433, 437 (2008).
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Id. at 451-54.
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Policy
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(March
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data charts appear in FTC v. Intel Corp., Intel’s Motion Under Rule 3.36 for Leave
to Take a Deposition of the Bureau of Labor Statistics Under Rule 3.33(c)(1), at
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available
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http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/100527intelmoleavedeposebls.pdf.
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Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the
Implementation of the Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of
the Treaty, in OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, at 1. Article 3(1): “Where the competition
authorities of the Member States or national courts apply national competition law
to agreements, decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices
within the meaning of Article 81(1) of the Treaty which may affect trade between
Member States within the meaning of that provision, they shall also apply Article
81 of the Treaty to such agreements, decisions or concerted practices.”
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period. 174 On the surface, the relevant market shares seemed to make the
deal unproblematic. iPhones enjoy a share of 5.3% of all Smartphones,
and Smartphones amount to only 10-13% of the mobile phones sold
worldwide. Orange had a 43.5% market share in French mobile phone
distribution market, which under the non-horizontal merger Guidelines
would have made the exclusive deal arguably unproblematic. 175 Further, it
is hard to see how exclusive channeling of a relatively small market share
item would foreclose rivals from the market.
The French Competition authority, however, believed that the iPhone’s
unique “attractiveness” made it a larger competitive presence than its
currently small market share. Rivals of Orange like SFR were signing their
own exclusive distribution deals for other attractive smartphones like the
Blackberry and HTC, but rather than considering the rivals’ exclusive deals
as likely to mitigate any foreclosing effects of the Apple-Orange deal, the
French Competition Authority worried about cumulative foreclosure by a
series of manufacturer-distributor deals. 176 Faced with the French
enforcement action, Apple and Orange agreed to suspend any pact of
exclusivity for the iPhones already in the market and to limit any exclusive
agreement concerning the distribution of future versions of this product 177
to a maximum of three months.
Under our substantial foreclosure test, the Apple/Orange exclusive
might not present even foreclosure, much less substantial foreclosure. The
fact that rival distributors were negotiating their own exclusive deals for
marquee brands suggests the existence of an active auction process for
exclusive distribution rights. If Orange foreclosed SFR by signing up
Apple, then SFR foreclosed Orange by signing up Blackberry and HTC.
More likely, the cellular phone distribution market is characterized by
“competition for the brand” rather than competition within the brand. 178 To
be sure, winner-takes-all auctions for exclusive distribution rights might
reduce the number of distributor firms or marginalize the fringe firms, but a
mere reduction in the number of distributors does not necessarily signal a
general diminution in the competitiveness of the distribution function.
Assuming that the exclusivity deal foreclosed some rival by denying it
a reasonable input-acquisition opportunity, there remains the question of
whether carriage of the iPhone was so important to the foreclosed
distributors that its denial threatened their existence in the cell phone
distribution market—the substantiality question. We do not dispute that
current market share numbers may sometimes be a poor proxy for the
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competitive importance of an input, but it is unlikely that access to the
iPhone was indispensable for survival in the market. Again, the example of
the SFR/Blackberry and HTC deals suggests the contrary.
Further, it would not be in Apple’s interests to grant exclusive
distributorship rights that would weaken the competitiveness of the
distribution market. 179 To Apple, distribution is merely a cost that it prefers
to cover as inexpensively as possible. A monopolist distributor would raise
prices and diminish sales, which would mean that Apple would sell fewer
iPhones without sharing in the distributor’s higher prices. 180 We do not
mean to suggest that exclusive distributorship agreements can never be
anticompetitive since the manufacturer’s interests on the question of
distributor power are aligned with those of the consumer. 181 However, in
the case of a strong and sophisticated manufacturer like Apple, the prospect
that the exclusive agreement would diminish the distribution segment’s
long-run competitiveness seems remote.
The Apple/Orange France episode provides an opportunity to reiterate a
point made earlier—that secondary line price discrimination is just a
species of input foreclosure. Suppose that instead of granting Orange
exclusivity, Apple had simply given it preferential pricing terms, which had
made it difficult for rival distributors to carry the iPhone. In that case, the
same analytical questions—did the discount structure deny rivals a
reasonable input purchase opportunity and was it so substantial that it
denied them a reasonable survival opportunity—should be addressed.
C. Multi-Product Foreclosure: Masimo/Tyco
As noted at the outset, one of the key sources of confusion in vertical
restraints cases has been the treatment of contractual terms that span
multiple product lines, particularly those that involve the grant of a price
concession in exchange for purchase commitments across multiple product
categories. 182 Courts have struggled to categorize such terms analytically,
analogizing or disanalogizing them to tying, exclusive dealing, bundling,
and predatory pricing. 183 This focus on legal categorization rather than
economic analysis has led to inconsistent and confused decisions.
A good example appears in the recent private litigation between
Masimo and Tyco, competitors in the production of pulse oximetry
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systems, which measure a patient’s lung function. 184 Masimo claimed that
Tyco attempted to exclude it from the pulse oximetry market through a
variety of vertical contractual practices including “loyalty discounts,” solesource exclusive dealing contracts, bundled rebates, and exclusionary
financing terms. 185 A jury returned a verdict for Masimo on several of the
challenged practices, but the district judge set aside the verdict insofar as it
predicated liability on the bundled rebates. 186 Masimo challenged that
holding on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
During the course of the appeal, the Ninth Circuit decided another
bundled discounting case—Cascade v. PeaceHealth. 187 In that case, the
Ninth Circuit held that “a plaintiff who challenges a package discount as
anticompetitive must prove that, when the full amount of the discounts
given by the defendant is allocated to the competitive product or products,
the resulting price of the competitive product or products is below the
defendant's incremental cost to produce them.” 188 On appeal, Masimo
resisted application of the PeaceHealth discount attribution standard,
arguing that “Tyco’s bundling practices were actually illegal market-share
discounts, rather than general bundled discounts.” 189 The court of appeals
credited Masimo’s argument:
There is truth to Masimo’s argument. Tyco’s bundling contracts gave
customers a price discount for purchasing a number of unrelated
products together, one being pulse oximetry. However, receipt of the
discount was conditioned upon customers purchasing 90-95% of
their requirements of those products from Tyco. If a customer bought
less than the required minimum, the discounts would be lost or
decreased. That is conditioning the discount on the requirement of
near complete exclusivity. This effectively prevents customers from
dealing in the goods of competitors, if the customers want to obtain
Tyco’s discount. That is the hallmark of exclusive dealing. 190
Despite agreeing in principle with Masimo’s argument, the court
affirmed the district court’s vacatur of the jury verdict because there was
insufficient evidence that the foreclosure was substantial. 191 Also, Masimo
had litigated the case under a bundled discount theory and should not be
allowed to change its position on appeal. 192
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The court of appeals’ reasoning illustrates the continued confusion
caused by form-based approach to vertical restraints. Under the court’s
approach, the initial decision was categorize the restraint as either bundled
discounting or tying/exclusive dealing. If the former, the practice would be
subject to a discount reallocation exercise for the purpose of establishing
whether an equally efficient rival that made only one of the products
covered by the bundled discount would be foreclosed from competing for
that product. If the practice were categorized as tying, foreclosure would be
assumed and the analysis would shift immediately into whether the
foreclosure was substantial.
Under our proposed framework, the foreclosure and substantiality
questions should be asked in succession regardless of any initial
categorization of the practice as bundled discounting, tying, exclusive
dealing, or something else. Failure to ask both questions could result in
false positives. Categorization of the practice as predatory pricing could
result in a finding of liability even though the number of effectively belowcost contracts was insufficient to deprive Masimo of a reasonable
opportunity to reach minimum viable scale. Categorization of the practice
as tying could result in a finding of liability even if Masimo was effectively
able to dissuade customers from accepting Tyco’s bundled offer by offering
its own above-cost price concessions.
The lynchpin of the court’s categorization decision was its belief that
the conditioning of the discount on a market share commitment “effectively
prevents customers from dealing in the goods of competitors, if the
customers want to obtain Tyco’s discount.” 193 But suppose that the
discounts on non-competitive products (i.e., products that Masimo did not
sell) were small enough that Masimo could profitably offer its own
discounts on pulse oximeters sufficient to neutralize the effect of Tyco’s
bundled offer. In that case, the fact that the bundled offer required a
minimum market share commitment from the customer would have no
foreclosing effect. Masimo apparently recognized this, since it claimed that
it would only have been able to match the discounts by pricing substantially
below cost. 194 If the converse were true, there would be no foreclosure.
CONCLUSION
The law of exclusionary vertical restraints is in dire need of overall
systematization. Courts and agencies on both sides of the Atlantic
frequently stumble over apparent differences between commercial practices
that are similar in their exclusionary potential. Instead of seeking to
understand whether the practices in fact diminished the market’s
competitiveness, the courts or agencies often fall back on categorical
formalisms that lead to dramatically different treatment of economically
indistinguishable practices.
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Fortunately, both US and EU legal and administrative structures
contain sufficient resources to emerge from the present muddle without
radical reimagination of either system’s principles or precedents. The twin
principles of foreclosure and substantiality that we have outlined in this
paper have sufficient roots in both systems to justify their incremental
elevation to a generalized test for exclusionary vertical restraints.
Merely recognizing substantial foreclosure as a meta analytical matrix
will not eliminate many difficulties in implementing vertical restraints
policy. Thorny issues—such as the appropriate measure of cost to use in
assessing foreclosure—will persist. Still, unifying the first principles would
establish a solid foundation for progressing toward a more coherent and
consistent vertical restraints policy.
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